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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW –– WHY AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION TO 
OVERRULE CITIZENS UNITED IS THE WRONG WAY TO FIX CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Once upon a time, there was a place called “Lesterland.” Lesterland was 
a lot like the United States. Like the United States, it had a population of 
about 311 million souls. Of that, like the United States, about 150,000 
were named “Lester.” Lesters in Lesterland had a very important power. 
There were two elections every election cycle in Lesterland – a general 
election, and a “Lester election.” In the general election, all citizens got 
to vote. In the Lester election, only the “Lesters” got to vote. But here’s 




Professor Lawrence Lessig, Director of the Edmond J. Safra Center for 
Ethics at Harvard University, uses the imagined Lesterland to illustrate a 
hypothetical political system.2 This metaphor’s power lies in how closely it 
resembles the current political system of the United States of America. In 
fact, the American system of electoral influence is even more distorted than 
that of Lesterland. In the 2012 election cycle, 132 donors, approximately 
.000042 percent of the country’s population, contributed 60 percent of the 
money raised by independent-expenditure only committees, commonly 
known as Super PACs.3 In turn, Super PACs comprised 47 percent of the 
independent expenditures for that cycle.4 Twenty-nine percent of outside 
spending came from political parties, traditional PACs, and other groups 
organized under Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code.5 
 
 1. LAWRENCE LESSIG, LESTERLAND: THE CORRUPTION OF CONGRESS AND HOW TO END 
IT 6 (2013). 
 2. Id. at 24. 
 3. Adam Lioz & Blair Bowie, Election Spending 2012: Post-Election Analysis of Fed-
eral Election Commission Data, DEMOS (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.demos.org/publication/
election-spending-2012-post-election-analysis-federal-election-commission-data. 
 4. Id. fig. 1. For a discussion of political action committees (PACs) and Super PACs, 
see PACs, Super PACs, & Dark Money Groups, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., http://
www.campaignlegalcenter.org/about/pacs-super-pacs-dark-money-groups (last visited Nov. 
3, 2017). 
 5. Id. The other sources of outside spending in the 2012 federal election were “social 
welfare groups” (21%), business associations (3%), and trade unions (< 1%). Id. See I.R.C. § 
527 (2012). 
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To illustrate the distortion in electoral influence created by these dis-
parate funding levels, it is useful to look more closely at data from the 2012 
federal election. As an example of this type of spending, the Adelson family 
contributed a total of $92.79 million to Super PACs,6 which is the equivalent 
of 261,000 individuals contributing the maximum “small donation” amount 
of $200.7 In fact, the aggregate of all small donations to major-party candi-
dates in 2012 was equivalent to roughly sixty-one donations from top-tier 
funders.8 
The figures for the 2016 election cycle are similarly outstanding, with 
just over 350 families accounting for more than half of all campaign dona-
tions through the first half of 2015.9 This represented the highest level of 
early campaign contributions from the smallest pool of donors in over forty 
years.10 Over the course of the entire election, just 100 top donors accounted 
for 60.8 percent of all Super PAC contributions.11 
In a system where campaign funding has a significant impact on politi-
cal success, such a disproportionate distribution of electoral power can fun-
damentally alter the relationship between elected officials and the governed 
public.12 As politicians grow to depend on a decreasing number of funding 
sources, their dependence on the public—an essential dynamic of our de-
mocracy—begins to erode.13 
Many scholars, including Professor Lessig, have attributed the widen-
ing of this influence gap to the Supreme Court of the United States (the 
“Supreme Court”) decision in Citizen’s United v. Federal Election Commis-
sion,14 which held that limitations on corporate spending in elections violat-
 
 6. 2012 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://
www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&disp=D&type=V&superonly
=N (last visited Jan. 10, 2018). 
 7. The FEC uses $200 as a threshold for reporting contributions; a party committee or 
PAC is not required to disclose the information of an individual or family who donates $200 
or less to the committee in one year. The FEC and Federal Campaign Finance Law, FED. 
ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/fecfeca.shtml (last updated Jan. 
2015). 
 8. Lioz & Bowie, supra note 3. 
 9. Nicholas Confessore et al., The Families Funding the 2016 Presidential Election, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/11/us/politics/
2016-presidential-election-super-pac-donors.html. 
 10. Id. 
 11. 2016 Super PACs: How Many Donors Give?, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.open
secrets.org/outsidespending/donor_stats.php?cycle=2016&type=B (last visited Aug. 12, 
2017). 
 12. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A 
PLAN TO STOP IT 243 (2011). 
 13. Id. 
 14. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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ed the First Amendment.15 In the years following that decision, public de-
bate about how to mitigate its impact has given rise to support for a constitu-
tional amendment regulating corporate speech.16 The majority of the pro-
posed amendments, however, have the potential to eviscerate essential con-
stitutional rights. This note argues that the proposed amendments to regulate 
campaign finance represent a dangerous and misguided approach to cam-
paign finance reform. 
Part II of this note discusses the development of modern campaign fi-
nance jurisprudence, beginning with the regulatory legislation of the 1970s 
to the McCutcheon17 decision in 2014 and concluding with a discussion of 
recent proposals for a constitutional amendment.18 Part III criticizes these 
proposed amendments for their vagueness and breadth and argues that their 
implementation would restrict more protected speech than intended, before 
surveying other options for campaign finance reform.19 Part IV concludes 
that, while it may be possible to draft an amendment that would not restrict 
an undesirable amount of speech, those who seek systemic election reform 
should instead promote a hybrid solution that incorporates both the en-
forcement of existing regulations and the implementation of innovative ap-
proaches to campaign finance.20 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Campaign Finance Law Before Citizens United Presented Conflicting 
Standards for Regulation 
1. Campaign Finance Regulation Became a Major Concern of the 
Federal Government in the Early Twentieth Century 
Federal campaign finance reform in the United States gained national 
attention in 1905, when President Theodore Roosevelt called for Congress 
to pass a law banning corporate spending towards political purposes.21 By 
the early twentieth century, legislators recognized that corporate expendi-
tures in federal elections had become a corrupting force in the American 
 
 15. Id. at 365. 
 16. Robert Weissman, Let the People Speak: The Case for a Constitutional Amendment 
to Remove Corporate Speech from the Ambit of the First Amendment, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 979, 
980 (2011). 
 17. McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. See infra Part IV. 
 21. The FEC and Federal Campaign Finance Law, supra note 7. 
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electoral system.22 Concerns about the corrupting power of corporate spend-
ing in elections led Congress to pass the Tillman Act of 1907,23 which con-
tained the first federal distinction between political spending by individuals 
and political spending by corporations.24 
Thirty years later, Congress supplemented the Tillman Act’s ban on 
corporate contributions with the Taft-Hartley Act,25 the first federal law reg-
ulating the independent expenditures of corporations and unions in support 
of, or opposition to, a candidate.26 These expenditure limits began a line of 
regulation that would continue into the twenty-first century and culminate in 
the landmark Citizens United decision.27 
2. The Modern Campaign Finance Regime Began with the Federal 
Election Campaign Act of 1971 
The modern era of American campaign finance jurisprudence has fo-
cused on interpreting provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971 (FECA) and its amendments.28 Congress dramatically reshaped the 
FECA with the adoption of several substantial amendments in 1974 (the 
“1974 Amendments”).29 Spurred by the Watergate scandal and the ensuing 
 
 22. See S. REP. NO. 59-3056, at 2 (1906) (“[t]he evils of the use of [corporate] money in 
connection with political elections are so generally recognized . . .”); Citizens United v. Fed-
eral Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. at 433 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The [Tillman] Act was 
primarily driven by two pressing concerns: first, the enormous power corporations had come 
to wield in federal elections, with the accompanying threat of both actual corruption and a 
public perception of corruption . . .”). 
 23. Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2012)); see 
S. REP. NO. 59-3056, at 2 (providing commentary on the motivation for the Tillman Act). 
 24. See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 433 (2010) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). 
 25. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, §304, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (1947) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). 
 26. Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 30 (2012). 
The term “independent expenditure” refers to “an expenditure by a person for a communica-
tion expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate that is not 
made in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candi-
date, a candidate’s authorized committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its 
agents.” 11 C.F.R. § 100.16 (2014). 
 27. 558 U.S. at 434 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 is of special 
significance for this case.”). 
 28. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–455 
(2012)); see J. Robert Abraham, Saving Buckley: Creating a Stable Campaign Finance 
Framework, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1078, 1081 (2010); Jacob Eisler, The Unspoken Institu-
tional Battle over Anticorruption: Citizens United, Honest Services, and the Legislative-
Judicial Divide, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363, 388–89 (2010). 
 29. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 
1263 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–455); see Abraham, supra note 28, at 1081 
(“The modern era of campaign finance jurisprudence began with the 1974 Amendments to 
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distrust in campaign finance practices,30 the 1974 Amendments established 
many of the regulatory mechanisms featured in contemporary campaign 
finance discourse, including the Federal Election Commission (FEC), con-
tribution limits for individuals and groups, expenditure limits for candidates, 
and independent expenditure limits.31 
The next major amendments to the FECA came with the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), commonly called the “McCain-
Feingold Act” after the sponsoring legislators, which extended campaign 
finance regulation to cover areas of concern that arose in the period after the 
1974 Amendments.32 The BCRA created the first federal regulations on 
“soft money,” the subset of money spent in federal campaigns that was pre-
viously exempted from both the FECA contribution limitations and the ban 
on the use of corporate and union treasury funds.33 Additionally, the BCRA 
defined a new category of federal campaign activity known as “electioneer-
ing communication,” also called “issue advocacy,” which is subject to regu-
lation if it is a broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that: 
(1) refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal office; 
(2) is broadcast within 60 days before a general election or 30 days be-
fore a primary; and 
(3) in the case where the communication refers to a candidate for an of-




the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and the judicial review of those provisions in the 
1976 Supreme Court case of Buckley v. Valeo”). 
 30. See S. REP. NO. 93-689 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5587, 5588 (“It 
was unfortunate that [FECA] did not become effective until April 7, 1971, because the 
scramble to raise political funds prior to that date . . . resulted in broad and grave dissatisfac-
tion”); see also J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE 
L. J. 1001, 1003 (1976) (“Congress passed these provisions in response to political abuses . . . 
commonly called Watergate.”). 
 31. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–455; see S. REP. NO. 93-689 (providing background on the 1974 
Amendments and their desired impact); see also Eisler, supra note 28, at 389 (providing a 
longer list of regulations established by the 1974 Amendments). 
 32. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (invalidated in part by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 
310) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 47 
U.S.C. (2012)) [hereinafter BCRA]. 
 33. Kang, supra note 26, at 150; see McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n., 540 U.S. 
93, 122–23 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n., 558 
U.S. 310 (2010) (“[P]rior to the enactment of BCRA, federal law permitted corporations and 
unions, as well as individuals who had already made the maximum permissible contributions 
to federal candidates, to contribute “nonfederal money”—also known as ‘soft money’—to 
political parties for activities intended to influence state or local elections.”). 
 34. BCRA, supra note 32, at § 201(a)(3)(A). 
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The BCRA regulated electioneering communication by prohibiting 
candidates and parties from (1) using soft money to finance issue advocacy, 
(2) extending the FECA disclosure requirements to apply to independent 
expenditures that qualify as issue advocacy, and (3) extending the ban on the 
use of corporate or union treasury funds to prohibit issue advocacy financ-
ing.35 The BCRA regulations of soft money and electioneering communica-
tion would become the central focus of the Citizens United decision.36 
3. The Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Decisions Do Not Pre-
sent a Consistent Regulatory Framework 
Far from presenting a coherent line of campaign finance jurisprudence, 
the Supreme Court cases interpreting the FECA and the BCRA represent 
inconsistent attempts to balance First Amendment protections with various 
regulatory goals.37 Beginning with the Court’s first interpretation of the 
FECA in Buckley v. Valeo,38 campaign finance decisions established shifting 
precedents through the present day, including the decision in Austin v. Mich-
igan Chamber of Commerce,39 which the majority opinion for Citizens Unit-
ed characterized as, “not well reasoned,” and “interfering with the market 
place of ideas.”40 
a. The Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo established the 
framework for subsequent campaign finance cases by setting 
distinct standards for expenditures and contributions 
The 1974 Amendments faced their first challenge before the Court in 
1976, resulting in the key campaign finance decision of the twentieth centu-
ry.41 The Buckley decision created a bifurcated analysis for limits on cam-
paign expenditures and contributions that became the standard framework 
 
 35. BCRA, supra note 32, at §§ 101, 201, 203, 311; See Kang, supra note 26, at 44. 
 36. 558 U.S. at 316, 320 (2010). 
 37. See Richard Briffault, On Dejudicializing American Campaign Finance Law, 27 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 887, 911 (2011) (“The Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence is a 
mess”); Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14 CONST. 
COMMENT. 127, 131 (1997) (“[T]hree standards of corruption . . . have been jumbled together 
in the corpus of campaign finance law”); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion 
of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 581 (2011) ([T]he Court’s campaign finance jurispru-
dence has swung like a pendulum . . .”). 
 38. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 39. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 40. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 314–15. 
 41. See Abraham, supra note 28, at 1078. 
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applied in campaign finance decisions for decades to come.42 This two-
tiered approach is based on the differentiation between expenditures, de-
fined as money spent independently for promoting a political end, and con-
tributions, defined as money given to a candidate or group for subsequent 
allocation.43 The Buckley Court’s interpretation of the FECA provisions re-
stricting expenditures and contributions hinged on those provisions curtail-
ing free speech rights protected by the First Amendment.44 Limiting speech 
to this extent would only be permissible if the governmental interest served 
by the expenditure ceiling was adequately significant to justify curbing a 
constitutional right.45 The Buckley Court, however, determined that the gov-
ernmental interest regarding campaign finance regulation was limited to the 
prevention of quid pro quo corruption or the appearance thereof, an objec-
tive for which the FECA expenditure ceiling was not sufficiently tailored.46 
Because expenditure limitations represent a direct restriction on the quantity 
of political communication, the Court explained that they must be subjected 
to the stringent level of “strict scrutiny” which is applied to regulations of 
“basic constitutional freedoms.”47 Contribution limits, however, should be 
subjected to a lesser standard of “exacting scrutiny,” because the transfor-
mation of a campaign contribution into political debate, “involves speech by 
someone other than the contributor.”48 
b. The Court first addressed corporate campaign expenditure in 
FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life 
The Court confronted the issue of corporate campaign spending limits 
in 1986, holding in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL) 
that a state law restricting independent expenditures was overbroad as ap-
plied to nonprofit, ideological corporations.49 Justice Brennan, writing for 
the majority in MCFL, asserted that regulation of corporate political activity 
should be aimed at restricting the “unfair deployment of wealth for political 
purposes.”50 From this perspective, legislation intended to mitigate the dan-
 
 42. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19–21; see Burke, supra note 37, at 131–32; Zephyr Teachout, 
The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 384 (2009). 
 43. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. 
 44. Id. at 14 (“The Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of 
the most fundamental First Amendment activities.”). 
 45. Id. at 45. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 25. 
 48. Id. at 21. 
 49. Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 
479 U.S. 238, 263–64 (1986); Burke, supra note 37, at 133–34; Hasen, supra note 37, at 
583–84. 
 50. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 259. 
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ger of corruption posed by profit-seeking corporations should not be so 
broad as to apply to a nonprofit organization.51 Although the decision in 
MCFL did address the issue of corporate campaign spending, the majority 
limited its discussion of regulating corporate expenditures to a distinction 
between that aim and the restriction of nonprofit political activity.52 The 
Court would not directly consider the constitutionality of restricting corpo-
rate expenditures for another four years, when the decision in Austin depart-
ed even further from Buckley’s anti-corruption jurisprudence.53 
c. The Court’s argument for preventing distortion in Austin v. 
Michigan State Chamber of Commerce would later be over-
turned by Citizens United 
In Austin, the decision that would bear the brunt of the judicial scorn in 
the Citizens United decision, the Court first articulated the concept of distor-
tion as a form of corruption to be targeted through campaign finance regula-
tion.54 Although the Austin Court recognized that restricting corporations’ 
rights based on their wealth is not justifiable, the Court also acknowledged 
corporate wealth can unfairly influence elections when it is deployed 
through independent expenditures.
 55 This unfair influence provided a suffi-
ciently compelling rationale for enforcing restrictions on such expendi-
tures.56 
d. The Court continued to depart from the Buckley standards in 
Nixon v. Shrink and McConnell v. FEC 
The Court’s decision in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC 
represented a further departure from the Buckley approach by upholding a 
relatively low contribution limit and stating that corruption concerns extend 
“to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large 
contributors.”57 Three years later, in the McConnell v. FEC58 decision, the 
Court continued to apply Austin’s broad definition of corruption in its deci-
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Hasen, supra note 37, at 587. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660–61; Burke, supra note 37, at 134; Robert Weissman, Let the 
People Speak: The Case for a Constitutional Amendment to Remove Corporate Speech from 
the Ambit of the First Amendment, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 979, 990 (2011). 
 55. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000); Briffault, supra note 37, 
at 903; Hasen, supra note 37, at 586–87. 
 58. McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n., 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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sion upholding regulations for issue advocacy advertisements.59 The dissents 
of Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas in McConnell would form the ba-
sis for much of the majority opinion in Citizens United.60 
B. The Decisions in Citizens United and McCutcheon Overturned Prece-
dent and Narrowed the Court’s Definition of Corruption 
The current standard of campaign finance jurisprudence is reflected in 
the Court’s decisions in Citizens United, which overturned Austin and parts 
of McConnell by declaring corporate expenditure limits unconstitutional, 
and McCutcheon, which struck down aggregate contribution limits for indi-
viduals.61 
1. The Citizens United Decision Signaled a Return to the Buckley 
Court’s Narrow Definition of Corruption 
The Citizens United case dealt with the airing of a ninety-minute doc-
umentary titled Hillary: The Movie, which was produced by Citizens Unit-
ed, a nonprofit organization that derives most of its funds from donations by 
individuals and for-profit corporations.62 The film, an electioneering com-
munication as defined by the BCRA, focused on then-Senator Hillary Clin-
ton, who was a candidate in the Democratic Party’s 2008 presidential prima-
ry elections at the time of the film’s release.63 Citizens United planned to 
release the film through video-on-demand services free of charge, a fact that 
was advertised through ten and thirty-second promotional videos run on 
broadcast and cable television.64 
Citizens United brought a suit for injunctive relief against the FEC, 
seeking declarative exemption from the application of the BCRA restrictions 
on the use of corporate treasury funds to finance publicly broadcasted issue 
advocacy.65 When the District Court denied Citizens United’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction, Citizens United appealed to the Supreme Court, 
which asked the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether the 
Court should overrule either or both Austin and the part of McConnell which 
 
 59. Hasen, supra note 37, at 589; Haley S. Peterson, McCutcheon v. FEC: Sacrificing 
Campaign Finance Regulation in the Name of Free Speech, 74 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 23, 33 
(2015). 
 60. See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 337, 351, 354 
(2010). 
 61. Id. at 365; McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014); 
Hasen, supra note 37, at 591; Peterson, supra note 59, at 23–24. 
 62. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319–21. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 321. 
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addresses the facial validity of the FECA.66 At rehearing, the Court recog-
nized that Austin contradicted previous case law, and the question before the 
Court was whether that decision should be overruled.67 
To decide whether to apply the doctrine of stare decisis in the case, the 
Court analyzed three arguments in support of Austin.68 The first argument 
rested on an interest in combatting distortion of information and influence in 
elections, but the Court reasoned that acknowledging such an interest could 
just as easily justify the banning of books and other non-campaign commu-
nications.69 This rationale is comparable to promoting the equalization of 
speech across the electorate, which would run counter to the Buckley deci-
sion and other First Amendment jurisprudence. 
The second major argument that the Court addressed in Citizens United 
identified a governmental interest in “anticorruption.”70 To explain its un-
derstanding of corruption, the Court invoked Buckley’s definition of a nar-
row governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or the ap-
pearance thereof.71 Furthermore, the Court stated that, “[t]he appearance of 
influence or access . . . will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our de-
mocracy,” and emphasized that actual corruption could be prevented by 
prohibiting coordination between funders utilizing independent expenditures 
and the candidates that those funders were supporting.72 
The Court then analyzed the final argument in support of Austin which 
was based on shareholder protection—that dissenting shareholders of a cor-
poration would feel compelled to fund corporate political speech against 
their will.73 The Court dismissed this argument on the primary grounds that, 
like the anti-distortion rationale, a protected governmental interest in shield-
ing the shareholders of corporations could be used to ban political speech, 
including the political speech of media corporations whose expressions are 
vital to political debate in a healthy democracy.74 The Court did recognize 
that shareholders may feel unfairly compelled to support speech with which 
they disagree, but did not find sufficient evidence that such a situation could 
not be corrected through the procedures of corporate democracy.75 
The Citizens United Court recognized that overturning precedent was a 
grave decision that should only be undertaken if “the most convincing of 
 
 66. Id. at 322. 
 67. Id. at 329. 
 68. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 357. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 360. 
 73. Id. at 361. 
 74. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361. 
 75. Id. at 362. 
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reasons demonstrates that adherence puts us on a course that is sure error.”76 
In light of this gravity, the Court emphasized that it would only overrule 
Austin after lengthy consideration of its implications for the contemporary 
system of federal elections and the surrounding political campaigns.77 
Ultimately, however, the Court overruled Austin and returned to the 
campaign finance jurisprudence of Buckley, stating that, “[n]o sufficient 
governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or 
for-profit corporations.”78 This declaration, that corporations held the same 
constitutionally protected right to political speech as individuals, sparked the 
development of several approaches to campaign finance reform by both pri-
vate actors and public officials in the years following the Citizens United 
decision.79 
2. The Court Continued Its Line of Reasoning from Citizens United 
in the McCutcheon Decision 
Four years after the Citizens United decision abolished corporate ex-
penditure limits, the Court struck down the BCRA aggregate limits on cam-
paign contributions, holding in its McCutcheon decision that such limits 
violated the constitutional guarantee of free speech.80 The aggregate limits 
of the BCRA permitted an individual to contribute a total of $48,600 to fed-
eral candidates and $74,600 to political committees, creating a contribution 
ceiling of $123,200 per two-year election cycle.81 In making this decision, 
the Court once again relied upon Buckley’s narrow definition of corruption 
as the quid pro quo exchange of money for an official act and reasoned that 
the government’s only interest in preventing corruption should be prohibit-
ing such an exchange or the appearance thereof.82 The McCutcheon decision 
did not, however, strike down all limits for contributions to federal candi-
dates. The BCRA contribution limit of $5,200 per election cycle per candi-
date remains intact,83 though the possibility of diffusing unlimited contribu-
tions through party committees renders that restriction virtually meaning-
less.84 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 364–65. 
 78. Id. at 365. 
 79. See Richard L. Hasen, Three Wrong Progressive Approaches (and One Right One) 
to Campaign Finance Reform, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 21, 22 (2014). 
 80. McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014). 
 81. Id. at 1442–43. 
 82. Id. at 1451 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26 (1976)). 
 83. Id. at 1442. 
 84. Robert K. Kelner, The Practical Consequences of McCutcheon, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 380, 380 (2014) (“[I]n the absence of an overall cap on spending, the donor could, in theo-
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Joint Fundraising Committees (JFCs) illustrate the impotence of the 
remaining limitations to political contributions. JFCs allow a group of can-
didates, party committees, or PACs to solicit donations as a group and then 
allocate the jointly raised money at the group’s discretion.85 This allows an 
individual donor to support multiple candidates and committees with a sin-
gle donation, with a de facto limit established by multiplying the $5,200 cap 
mentioned above by the number of candidates within the JFC.86 Although 
the McCutcheon Court’s plurality expressed skepticism about the potential 
for JFCs as vehicles for circumventing contribution limits, Justice Breyer 
noted in his dissent, “[a]fter today’s decision, [an individual donor] could 
write a single check to the Joint Party Committee in an amount of about $1.2 
million.”87 Indeed, within two weeks of the McCutcheon decision, all three 
Republican national party committees formed a JFC called the Republican 
Victory Fund, which could solicit more than $97,000 in one check.88 
Though the McCutcheon and Citizens United decisions impacted dif-
ferent areas of campaign finance law, they both had the effect of enhancing 
the capacity of wealthy donors to spend large sums of money on federal 
elections.89 Although campaign spending from outside groups had begun to 
increase significantly as early as 2004,90 public dissatisfaction with cam-
paign finance has grown considerably in the wake of these two important 
decisions.91 
C. The Years Following Citizens United Have Seen a Proliferation of Pro-
posed Constitutional Amendments 
In the past four years, American legislators have proposed fifty-four 
resolutions that would amend the Constitution to counter the effects of Citi-
zens United on campaign finance regulation.92 Over the same period, multi-
ple organizations formed with the purpose of proposing and promoting con-
 
ry, spend millions of dollars before running out of federal candidates and committees to sup-
port.”). 
 85. Id. at 382. 
 86. Id. 
 87. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1472 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The “Joint Party Commit-
tee” in Justice Breyer’s example is a JFC joining all the state and national committees of a 
particular political party. Id. 
 88. Kelner, supra note 84, at 383; Liz Kennedy & Seth Katsuya Endo, The World Ac-
cording to, and After, McCutcheon v. FEC, and Why It Matters, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 533, 537 
(2015). This represented a 20% increase from the maximum donation before McCutcheon. Id. 
 89. See Kennedy & Endo, supra note 88, at 566. 
 90. Kelner, supra note 84, at 385–86. 
 91. Kennedy & Endo, supra note 88, at 566. 
 92. See Constitutional Amendments, UNITED FOR PEOPLE, http://united4thepeople.org/
amendments (last visited Mar. 17, 2016) (providing a list of proposed amendments for each 
congressional term). 
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stitutional amendments to overturn the Citizens United and McCutcheon 
rulings.93 This movement to amend the constitution has garnered the support 
of 18 state legislatures and 144 members of the 115
th
 United States Con-
gress.94 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. The Proposed Amendments Run Counter to Established First Amend-
ment Jurisprudence 
The protection of free expression in the First Amendment to the Con-
stitution is justified by its promotion of fundamental values such as self-
governance, the discovery of truth, advancing autonomy, and promoting 
tolerance.95 Any law that regulates speech may be facially unconstitutional if 
it is either unduly vague or overbroad.96 Though the proposed amendments 
to overturn Citizens United and McCutcheon, if ratified, would be inherently 
constitutional and therefore not subject to invalidation for vagueness or 
overbreadth, the concerns underlying those doctrines of First Amendment 
jurisprudence are relevant to examining the proposals’ potential impact. 
B. The Proposed Amendments Are Vague and Overbroad 
1. The Proposed Amendments Are Unduly Vague if a Reasonable 
Person Cannot Tell Which Speech Is Prohibited and Which Is 
Permitted. 
The Supreme Court’s void-for-vagueness doctrine seeks to avoid the 
violation of due process that occurs when a statute either forbids or requires 
a certain behavior in terms so vague “that men of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.”97 Several 
proposed amendments contain vague language that would violate notions of 
 
 93. See, e.g., MOVE TO AMEND, https://movetoamend.org (last visited Mar. 17, 2016) 
(proposing specific language for a constitutional amendment); FREE SPEECH FOR PEOPLE, 
http://freespeechforpeople.org (last visited Mar. 17, 2016) (advocating for a constitutional 
amendment and promoting current legislative proposals); DEMOCRACY IS FOR PEOPLE, 
http://www.democracyisforpeople.org (last visited Mar. 17, 2016) (building a movement to 
counteract the decisions in Citizens United and McCutcheon as a project of Public Citizen). 
 94. For a complete list of endorsements, see Congress, united4thepeople.org, http://
united4thepeople.org/congress (last visited Mar. 2017) (providing a complete list of en-
dorsements). 
 95. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1208–12 
(3rd ed. 2006). 
 96. Id. at 1213. 
 97. Connally v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
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fair play and leave both corporate and state actors guessing as to whether 
particular behavior constitutes a violation of the constitution.98 
The amendment proposed by the organization Move to Amend pro-
vides an example of such problematically vague language. The proposal’s 
second article contains the following provision: 
Federal, State, and local government shall regulate, limit, or prohibit 
contributions and expenditures, including a candidate’s own contribu-
tions and expenditures, to ensure that all citizens, regardless of their eco-
nomic status, have access to the political process, and that no person 
gains, as a result of their money, substantially more access or ability to 




The requirement that all levels of government shall regulate campaign 
contributions to ensure equality of access and influence for all citizens cre-
ates a constitutional standard for regulatory behavior without adequately 
defining what that behavior would entail.100 
To illustrate the potential danger of the vague language contained in 
this proposed amendment, it is helpful to consider hypothetical situations in 
which the amendment, if enacted, would put unintended actors in the cross-
hairs of constitutional challenges. For example, when a local government 
enacted campaign finance regulations, as it would be required to do under 
the proposed language, the regulation would have to “ensure that . . . no 
person gains, as a result of their money, substantially more access or ability 
to influence in any way the election of any candidate.”101 Under this regime, 
a party with appropriate standing could bring a suit against the local gov-
ernment for violating the Constitution if any wealthy person was reasonably 
perceived to have gained access or influence of a local candidate. This con-
cern has equal application for media organizations that convey political 
messages––imagine if courts had to decide whether the Washington Post 
had an unequal ability to influence a candidate due to its financial resources. 
The adoption of this amendment would result in either an inordinate out-
burst of lawsuits against state and local governments, or the enforcement of 
draconian electoral regulations that would force equalization of speech 
across the respective electorate. 
This hypothetical scenario may seem extreme, but it is representative 
of many scenarios that might develop following the adoption of a danger-
 
 98. See, e.g., Move to Amend’s Proposed 28th Amendment to the Constitution, MOVE TO 
AMEND, https://movetoamend.org/wethepeopleamendment (last visited Mar. 26, 2017). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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ously vague constitutional amendment intended to overturn the ruling of 
Citizens United. 
2. The Proposed Amendments Are Overbroad if Other Areas of Pro-
tected Speech Are Significantly Compromised 
The Supreme Court’s overbreadth doctrine holds that a statute restrict-
ing speech can result in a “continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom 
of discussion that might reasonably be regarded as within its purview.”102 
This standard applies to overbroad laws that regulate substantially more 
speech than the Constitution allows to be regulated.103 
The amendment proposed by Senator John Tester and Senator Chris 
Murphy provides an example of the overbreadth that typifies language in the 
proposed amendments, stating the following in its second section: 
The words people, person, or citizen as used in this Constitution do not 
include corporations, limited liability companies, or other corporate enti-
ties established by the laws of any State, the United States, or any for-
eign state, and such corporate entities are subject to such regulation as 
the people, through their elected State and Federal representatives, deem 
reasonable and are otherwise consistent with the powers of Congress and 
the States under this Constitution.
 104
 
Not only would this amendment redefine corporate rights across the en-
tire Constitution, but it would restrict substantially more speech than it aims 
to curb in its attempt to regulate campaign finance. 
One could imagine that removing all constitutional protections from 
corporate entities would open the door for many restrictions on the activities 
of both nonprofit and for-profit corporations. Churches and other charitable 
organizations could have their legal protections dismantled, opening them to 
a variety of regulations based on the content of their activities. Alternatively, 
if a proposed amendment only stripped away the speech rights of corpora-
tions, media outlets would face constitutionally sanctioned repercussions for 
expressing political opinions. This would have particularly severe conse-
quences for the news media, which have traditionally served as key institu-
tions in the American political process. Even the practice of newspaper en-
dorsements for local candidates would violate the Constitution. These sce-
narios seem to belong in a dystopian imagining of America’s future, but 
 
 102. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 629 (1973). 
 103. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 95. 
 104. S.J. RES. 18, 113TH CONG. (2013); Move to Amend’s proposal contains a similar 
provision stating that, “artificial entities established by the laws of any State . . . shall have no 
rights under this Constitution and are subject to regulation by the People, through Federal, 
State, or local law.” MOVE TO AMEND, supra note 98. 
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they represent a very real weakness of what has so far been the most popular 
approach to overturning the Citizens United decision. 
Some groups have anticipated this challenge to potential amendments 
by including language that explicitly preserves freedom of the press.105 The 
amendment proposed by Senator Bernie Sanders, for example, includes the 
simple language, “Nothing in this Article shall be construed to alter the 
freedom of the press.”106 The same resolution, however, seems to propose 
broad regulations that could easily impinge on a media corporation’s activi-
ty during an election, stating: 
Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to restrict the power of 
Congress and the States to protect the integrity and fairness of the elec-
toral process . . . which may include . . . the imposition of requirements 
to ensure the disclosure of contributions and expenditures made to influ-
ence the outcome of a public election by candidates, individuals, and as-
sociations of individuals, and the imposition of content neutral limita-
tions on all such contributions and expenditures.
107
 
The “imposition of content neutral limitations” on the political speech 
of “associations of individuals” has the potential, if not the explicit aim, to 
circumscribe the activity of organizations that create or distribute campaign-
oriented content. Similar to the limitations on media activity discussed in the 
paragraphs above, this language could easily be construed as supporting 
restrictions on institutions of the press. Additionally, even if the limiting 
language were sufficient to protect the freedom of the press, cases determin-
ing whether particular communications constituted protected press behavior 
rather than electioneering would overwhelm the courts. 
3. Even Carefully Worded Proposals, Like Other Constitutional 
Amendments, Lack Detail Needed for Effective Guidance in Cam-
paign Finance 
At least one proposed amendment goes even further to ensure the pro-
tection of constitutional rights, stating that “[n]othing in this Constitution 
shall be construed to limit the rights enumerated in this Constitution and 
other rights retained by the people, which are unalienable.”108 Though this 
 
 105. See, e.g., S.J. RES. 5, 114TH CONG. § 3 (2015) (“Nothing in this article shall be con-
strued to grant Congress or the States the power to abridge the freedom of the press.”); S.J. 
RES. 4, 114TH CONG. § 3 (2015) (“Nothing in this Article shall be construed to alter the free-
dom of the press.”); S.J. RES. 7, 113TH CONG. § 4 (2014) (Nothing in this Constitution shall be 
construed to limit the rights enumerated in this Constitution and other rights retained by the 
people, which are unalienable.”). 
 106. S.J. RES. 4 at § 3. 
 107. Id. at § 2. 
 108. S.J. RES. 7 at § 4. 
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language attempts to create a firewall between the proposed power to regu-
late campaign finance and the civil liberties already guaranteed by the Con-
stitution, it does not provide any guidance as to how a court would balance 
these constitutional provisions if and when they conflict.109 
The lack of detailed language to guide courts in applying these pro-
posals is not unique to campaign finance amendments. In fact, differing in-
terpretations of existing amendments to the Constitution have formed com-
peting visions of civil liberties for centuries. An obvious way to combat the 
problematic vagueness and breadth that plagues the foregoing proposals 
would be to include detailed commentary and illustrations, similar to the 
guiding language in the American Law Institute’s Restatements.110 This ap-
proach, besides departing from federal constitutional norms, would require a 
burdensome process; the drafting of a Restatement, for example, may in-
volve coordination and consultation between the American Bar Association, 
the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, the Defense Research and 
Trial Lawyers Association, and the Product Liability Advisory Council ––all 
before the preparation of a second draft.111 If this is the degree of time and 
effort put into detailing the proper interpretation of a non-binding legal au-
thority, certainly a comparable level of attention should be paid to the more 
consequential and historic task of amending the Constitution.112 
The most common method for constitutional change in the United 
States is incremental and informal amending through a strong judiciary, 
which is a more fluid and responsive process than the path to formal amend-
ing.113 Because this typical process of constitutional change has failed to 
produce a consistent standard for evaluating campaign finance re-
strictions,114 activists seek to formally amend the Constitution.115 Even with 
the inclusion of detailed commentary, however, an amendment to the Con-
 
 109. Modern campaign finance cases have primarily dealt with this precise conflict, and 
the resulting jurisprudence has been inconsistent and contentious. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 110. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST. 1981). Each 
section of the Restatements provides painstakingly detailed examples of how its persuasive 
authority should be applied in various situations. These illustrations are often longer than the 
section itself. See id. at § 1 cmt. e, illus. 1. 
 111. Aaron D. Twerski, Inside the Restatement, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 839, 840 (1997). 
 112. The inclusion of detailed commentary is not part of the American constitutional 
tradition, a thorough discussion of which is outside the scope of this paper. For an in-depth 
examination of amendment-drafting practices at the state and federal level, see Donald S. 
Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355 (1994). 
 113. Richard Albert, The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 49 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 913, 925 (2014). In the field of comparative law, this is referred to as the “evolution-
ary model” of constitutional change, though there remains controversy as to whether informal 
amendments are legitimate. Id. 
 114. See supra Part II.A.3–4. 
 115. See supra Part II.C. 
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stitution is not the ideal tool for reforming the current system of campaign 
finance. 
C. Amending the Constitution Is Not the Most Effective Means of Cam-
paign Finance Reform 
Campaign finance experts like Richard Hasen suggest that amending 
the Constitution is not the ideal means for overturning Citizens United and 
McCutcheon, or for effecting campaign finance regulation more broadly.116 
Even if a proposed amendment could avoid the problems identified in the 
foregoing hypothetical scenarios, there are additional concerns about the 
effectiveness of an approach that focuses only on overturning Citizens Unit-
ed. For instance, an amendment written simply to reverse the decision in 
Citizens United would leave undisturbed the system of massive campaign 
contributions that allows a small group of wealthy donors to have access to 
and influence over American politicians at the state and federal levels.117 
Lawrence Lessig has expressed similar concerns about the ineffectiveness of 
an amendment overturning Citizens United, as well as doubts as to whether 
such an amendment could even withstand the process required for adop-
tion.118 Additionally, considering the improbability of an amendment adop-
tion and the uncertainty of the impact such an amendment might have, Les-
sig argues that harnessing the significant popular energy required to pursue a 
constitutional amendment would be a disastrous misdirection of a mobilized 
electorate.119 
Despite widespread disapproval of Citizens United, it is not clear that 
overturning that decision is the most effective approach to reform. It may be 
prudent to first explore the toolkit of unenforced legal mechanisms for regu-
lation, along with the various alternative approaches to campaign finance 
reform that have proliferated in recent years. 
1. Public Finance Could Provide an Alternative Funding Source for 
Federal Candidates 
The system of public financing for federal candidates, created by the 
1974 amendments to FECA, was used to significant effect by presidential 
candidates for nearly two decades after its adoption.120 After the 2008 elec-
tion and the subsequent decision in Citizens United, however, this method of 
 
 116. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 79. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See LESSIG, supra note 12. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, supra note 29; See LESSIG, 
supra note 12. 
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funding has been largely discarded in favor of Super PAC financing and 
other novel approaches to soliciting money from large donors.121 It is possi-
ble that the public finance system built for the political reality of forty-years 
ago is not equipped to combat the influence and allure of today’s multibil-
lion-dollar campaigns. 
Professor Lessig is among those who have called for an updated ver-
sion of public finance mechanisms to address the influx of money in recent 
federal elections.122 His proposal, named the “Grant and Franklin Project,” 
would give each taxpayer a fifty-dollar rebate in the form of a “Democracy 
Voucher,” which could be contributed in whole or in part to any candidate 
who has agreed to finance his or her campaign exclusively through this pro-
gram.123 By Lessig’s estimate, this process could double the amount of pub-
lic funding available to federal candidates, effectively countering the appeal 
of Super PACs and other popular finance mechanisms.124 This proposal’s 
viability, however, is undercut by the Court’s decision in Arizona Free En-
terprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,125 which would prevent Con-
gress from implementing a voluntary voucher plan that increases the amount 
of public financing for candidates facing large independent spending against 
them.126 Still, Lessig’s approach has promise if it could be implemented 
within constitutional limits. 
2. Enforcing Existing Disclosure Laws Could Allow Voters to Make 
Informed Decisions About the Candidates That They Support 
Missing from many contemporary discussions of campaign finance is 
the lacking enforcement of disclosure laws that were deliberately left intact 
by the Citizens United Court.127 In the 2012 election cycle, undisclosed fun-
ders were responsible for 37 percent of all electioneering communica-
 
 121. Lioz & Bowie, supra note 3. 
 122. Ganesh Sitaraman, Contracting Around Citizens United, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 755, 
764 (2014); see LESSIG, supra note 12, at 268. 
 123. Lawrence Lessig, The Grant and Franklin Project, LESSIG BLOG (Dec. 17, 2011), 
http://lessig.tumblr.com/post/14357153028/the-grant-and-franklin-project. The proposed 
system makes Democracy Voucher financing available to candidates who agree to take mon-
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 124. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 268–9. Lessig estimates that the program could raise 
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raised in all 2010 elections. Id. 
 125. 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). 
 126. Richard L. Hasen, Fixing Washington Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Politics 
- and a Plan to Stop It. by Lawrence Lessig. New York, N.Y., and Boston, Mass.: Twelve 
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tions.128 Secret funding is often accomplished by channeling private money 
through the relatively unregulated category of nonprofit organizations 
known as “social welfare” corporations, organized under Section 5.01(c)(4) 
of the tax code.129 Under current FEC standards, these organizations are not 
required to disclose the sources of their funds if they are predominantly en-
gaged in activities that promote social welfare.130 Although political expend-
itures, such as the publication of electioneering communications, do not 
qualify as the promotion of social welfare, organizations can remain exempt 
from FEC regulations as long as those expenditures make up 49 percent or 
less of all organizational spending.131 The adoption of current proposals to 
amend IRS and FEC policy towards currently exempt organizations would 
close many of these loopholes in the contemporary campaign finance sys-
tem. 
In addition to the existing disclosure rules, legislators in both houses of 
Congress have recently advanced proposals to enhance transparency in 
campaign finance.132 These bills, however, have failed to gain the necessary 
support for adoption into law, underscoring the lack of political will for en-
acting additional regulations for campaign finance.133 
3. Eliminating Limits on Hard Money Contributions to Candidates 
Could Detangle the Campaign Finance Regime That Has Led to 
Current Spending Norms 
Building on the idea of transparency, another option for campaign fi-
nance reform is for Congress to remove all restrictions on contributions to 
candidate campaigns, regardless of the donor’s personhood or nonprofit 
status.134 This approach would “unwind the path that has led to this point in 
the nation’s campaign finance history,” and, “disregard the various distinc-
tions [that Buckley] drew between political campaign contributions and in-
dependent expenditures in the course of upholding amount limits on the 
former but not the latter.”135 In addition to tidily resolving many of the First 
Amendment concerns associated with current campaign finance regulations, 
this approach has the potential to improve the tone of modern campaign 
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advertisements by allowing voters to hold candidates, rather than Super 
PACs, accountable for negative content.136 Though this idea has not been 
advanced legislatively, it is likely that an ambitious rollback of campaign 
finance restrictions would face backlash from the vocal advocates and poli-
ticians who have made overturning Citizens United a key plank of their plat-
forms. 
4. Promoting Intra-Candidate Contracts That Disincentivize Outside 
Spending Could Provide a Private Sector Solution to Campaign 
Finance Problems 
Perhaps the most creative, and unorthodox, approach to campaign fi-
nance reform promotes the institution of “private ordering” agreements be-
tween candidates.137 This option involves opposing candidates submitting to 
a binding agreement that would penalize each campaign for outside spend-
ing by groups that support the candidate.138 Because this form of self-
regulation operates as a private contract, it is not subject to the constitutional 
concerns that mark the other campaign finance approaches discussed 
above.139 Similarly, a private ordering option would not depend on the polit-
ical viability of particular legislation, which has proven to be a significant 
hindrance to other methods of regulation.140 
The private ordering approach is, however, susceptible to critiques 
from those who support the First Amendment jurisprudence of Citizens 
United, as such agreements may be seen as restricting both the amount of 
speech and the type of speaker that would be allowed in campaigns.141 Pri-
vate ordering is also vulnerable to attack from the other side of the campaign 
finance debate, particularly if the efficacy of private arrangements is used as 
an argument against universally enforceable regulation.142 Regardless of the 
ultimate sufficiency of a private ordering option, a contract-based approach 
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provides a model for self-regulation that avoids many of the pitfalls facing 
proposed amendments and other potential methods for campaign finance 
reform. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Citizens of the United States who are able to marshal large quantities of 
money for campaign contributions, either as individuals or corporations, are 
able to gain access to political influence that is not available to the vast ma-
jority of the population. This influence leads to policy outcomes that align 
primarily with the interests of a narrow segment of the population rather 
than producing policies aligning with the values and goals of Americans 
more broadly.143 
Though the focus of many election reform activists has been on over-
turning Citizens United through a constitutional amendment, there are sev-
eral reasons that this is not the most productive approach for campaign fi-
nance regulation. The language of proposed amendments risks restricting 
vital constitutional rights, and drafting the proposals more carefully would 
run counter to the dominant method of constitutional change in the United 
States.144 Additionally, the political viability of passing a constitutional 
amendment is low enough to suggest that other, more practical methods 
should take priority for reformers. 
Other popular approaches to campaign finance reform have drawbacks 
as well, such as the inefficacy of disclosure regimes and the dubious consti-
tutionality of public financing vouchers.145 Either of those approaches, how-
ever, has the advantage of being based in existing campaign finance strate-
gies,
 146 avoiding the extraordinary maneuvers required to adopt a constitu-
tional amendment. Furthermore, the fact that several promising options have 
yet to be widely explored147 underscores the inefficiency of putting signifi-
cant reformist energy towards what would certainly be a long and controver-
sial battle to amend the Constitution.148 
Moving forward, activists and politicians who wish to create a more 
open and equitable political system should aim to combine enforcement of 
existing regulations with the promotion of innovative campaign finance 
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methods. This tactical approach would be the most effective means towards 
the strategic goals of campaign finance reformers, and its implementation 







* J.D., UA Little Rock, William H. Bowen School of Law, May 2018; Master of Public Ser-
vice, Clinton School of Public Service, May 2018. I would like to thank Professor Josh Sil-
verstein and Carly Hays for supervising my writing process, members of the Law Review 
Editorial Board for their hard work, and my family and friends for enduring months of me 
thinking out loud. 
